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I. INTRODUCTION
Life is delicate.  Consequently, life insurance policies play a significant
role in Americans’ financial and domestic affairs by protecting a family mem-
ber or caregiver from a loss resulting from an untimely death of the insured.1
Additionally, life insurance policies allow a surviving spouse or child to con-
tinue living the lifestyle they are accustomed to without depending on charity
or state assistance.2  Despite all of their benefits, life insurance policies create
perverse incentives for beneficiaries.  For example, a life insurance policy may
tempt a greedy beneficiary to kill the insured in order to collect the policy
proceeds.3  However, the ancient equitable maxim, nullus commodum capere
potest de injuria sua propria (no one is permitted to profit from his own
wrongdoing), prevents such a killer from collecting the insurance policy
proceeds.4
Forty-five states, including Nevada, have codified this equitable maxim, as
it applies to killers of insureds, into slayer statutes.5  Furthermore, slayer stat-
utes provide some protections for insurance companies,6 who often face com-
peting claims to insurance proceeds in the event of an insured’s death.7  Every
state within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Ninth and Tenth Circuit Courts
of Appeals, except Nevada, has explicitly promulgated that an insurance com-
pany is liable if the insurance company makes a payment after it has received
written notice of a claim adverse to the beneficiary’s claim.8  By contrast, the
Nevada slayer statute does not create insurance liability when an insurance
1 Kelvin H. Dickinson, Divorce and Life Insurance:  Post Mortem Remedies for Breach of a
Duty to Maintain a Policy for a Designated Beneficiary, 61 MO. L. REV. 533, 533 (1996).
2 Id. at 534.
3 Gary Schuman, Life Insurance and the Homicidal Beneficiary: The Insurer’s Responsibili-
ties Under State Slayer Laws and Statutes, 51 FED’N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 197, 197–98
(2001).
4 Kathryn R. Bennett, Case Note, Spencer v. Floyd: Distribution of Life Insurance Pro-
ceeds When the Primary Beneficiary is Disqualified, 45 ARK. L. REV. 213, 218-19 (1992);
see also Keen v. Weaver, 121 S.W.3d 721, 730 (Tex. 2003).
5 In re Estate of Blodgett, 147 P.3d 702, 705 n.10 (Alaska 2006); see, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 41B.200 (2007).
6 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.803(g) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803(G) (2008);
CAL. PROB. CODE § 256 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-803(8) (2008); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 560:2-803(h)(1) (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-803(k) (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 58-714(a)(1) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-813(8)(a) (2007); N.M. STAT. § 45-2-
803(H) (2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 231 (2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.535 (2008); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-2-803(8)(a) (2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.84.110 (2008); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 2-14-101(c) (2008).
7 Schuman, supra note 3, at 221.
8 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.803(g) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803(G) (2008);
CAL. PROB. CODE § 256 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-803(8) (2008); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 560:2-803(h)(1) (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-803(k) (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 58-714(a)(1) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-813(8)(a) (2007); N.M. STAT. § 45-2-
803(H) (2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 231 (2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.535 (2008); UTAH
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company pays the proceeds to a beneficiary after receipt of written notice.9
Instead, in Nevada, a court may hold an insurance company liable if an insur-
ance company has actual knowledge that a beneficiary is the killer of the
insured.10  However, the Nevada Legislature failed to define “actual knowl-
edge,” thereby creating a substantial ambiguity as to when an insurance com-
pany is liable for paying out policy proceeds.11  For example, an insurance
company is confronted with a “to pay or not to pay” dilemma where a benefici-
ary is not convicted of a felonious or intentional killing, but is a suspect of an
insured’s murder.
This Note addresses the Nevada Legislature’s failure to define “actual
knowledge” in its slayer statute and the repercussions insurance companies face
as a result.  In Part II, this Note provides the historical background of slayer
statutes in general, the history of the Nevada slayer statute, and the current
status of the Ninth and Tenth Circuit states’ slayer statutes (with the exception
of Nevada).  Next, Part III analyzes the legislative history underlying the
Nevada slayer statute and interprets the Nevada Legislature’s intended meaning
of “actual knowledge.”  Additionally, Part III proposes a definition of “actual
knowledge” that mirrors how the other Ninth and Tenth Circuit states define
when an insurance company is liable.  In the event that the Nevada Legislature
does not amend the Nevada slayer statute to define “actual knowledge,” this
Note proposes two additional solutions for insurance companies confronted
with the “to pay or not to pay” dilemma.  First, insurance companies should
include a clause in their insurance policies stating they are not liable for paying
the policy proceeds to the beneficiary unless they have received actual written
notice of a claim adverse to the beneficiary.  Second, insurance companies
should file an interpleader action, deposit the policy proceeds with the court,
and allow the court to determine which party should receive the monies.
Finally, this Note concludes in Part IV.
II. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SLAYER STATUTES
A. A Brief History of Slayer Statutes
In the early English system, slayer statutes did not exist because the
English system used common law doctrines of attainder, corruption, forfeiture
of blood, and escheat to prevent slayers from monetarily collecting on their
crimes.12  However, in 1814, the English Parliament abolished these ancient
doctrines.13  Fifty-six years later, the Parliament replaced these doctrines with
the Forfeiture Act of 1870.14  The Forfeiture Act forced the English courts to
either use innovative remedies or allow the slayers to monetarily benefit from
CODE ANN. § 75-2-803(8)(a) (2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.84.110 (2008); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 2-14-101(c) (2008).
9 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41B.400 (2007).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Gregory C. Blackwell, Property:  Creating a Slayer Statute Oklahomans Can Live With,
57 OKLA. L. REV. 143, 145-46 (2004).
13 Id. at 146.
14 Id.
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their crimes.15  The English courts chose the former option, implementing pub-
lic policy that no slayer was permitted to benefit from his wrongdoing.16
American colonial law did not adopt England’s archaic doctrines of cor-
ruption of blood and forfeiture of estate.17  However, the American courts
adopted the equitable maxim that no one may benefit from his own wrongs.18
The first reported American case involving a slayer attempting to reap the ben-
efits of his crime is New York Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Armstrong.19  In
New York Mutual, a man bought an insurance policy on his own life and
assigned the policy to a third party.20  The assignee was convicted of killing the
insured, and the insurance company refused to pay the policy proceeds to the
slayer.21  The court held that the slayer forfeited his rights to the policy pro-
ceeds when he murdered the insured because “[i]t would be a reproach to the
jurisprudence of the country, if one could recover insurance money payable on
the death of a party whose life he had feloniously taken.”22
If a slayer were allowed to recover the policy proceeds, society’s sense of
morality and equity would be compromised, as exemplified in Prudential
Insurance Co. of America v. Harrison.23  In Prudential, a husband became
angered when his wife innocently spoke to an acquaintance while they waited
for their table at a restaurant.24  When the husband and wife returned home
after dinner, the husband struck his wife with such force that she fell into the
bathtub, sustaining severe injuries.25  The wife died in the hospital several
hours later.26  The husband was charged with murder, and the court held that
his wrong prevented him from collecting on his wife’s interest in the insurance
policy.27
In order to ensure that cases such as Prudential were decided in accor-
dance with the equitable maxim that no one should benefit from his own
wrongdoing, many state courts construed probate statutes to prevent a benefici-
ary who murdered the insured from collecting the insured’s policy proceeds.28
Over the years, the District of Columbia and forty-five states, including
Nevada, codified the equitable maxim into what have become known as “slayer






19 Id. (citing N.Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886)).
20 Id. at 146-47 (citing N.Y. Mut, 117 U.S. at 592-93).
21 Id. at 147.
22 Id. (citing N.Y. Mut., 117 U.S. at 600).
23 See PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AM. V. HARRISON, 106 F. Supp. 419, 426 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
24 Id. at 421.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 425.  The court, however, allowed the husband to recover his own interest in the
policy as an owner of one half of the community property. Id. at 426.
28 In re Estate of Blodgett, 147 P.3d 702, 705 (Alaska 2006).
29 Id. at 705 n.10 (internal citations omitted).
30 Id. (internal citations omitted).  The common law follows the equitable maxim that no
one may benefit from his own wrongdoing. Id. at 705.
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Most states sought to address in their slayer statutes what “acts are neces-
sary and sufficient to confer slayer status and how a potential plaintiff must
prove those acts.”31  The majority of slayer statutes, including Nevada’s, state
“a slayer is a person who, without legal excuse or justification, is responsible
for the felonious and intentional killing of another.”32  A “felonious” killing
refers to criminal offenses that are felonies.33  Under the Model Penal Code
section 1.04(2), “[a] crime is a felony if it is so designated in [the] Code or if
persons convicted thereof may be sentenced [to death or] to imprisonment for a
term that, apart from an extended term, is in excess of one year.”34  Further-
more, a person is responsible for the “intentional” killing of another, as
required to constitute a slayer under most slayer statutes, if the person acted
with the intent to kill.35  Premeditation is not required.36  However, intent not
only includes the consequences the actor intended to produce, but also the con-
sequences the actor knew, to a substantial certainty, would occur.37  An “inten-
tional” killing for the purposes of a slayer statute does not typically include a
reckless, accidental, or negligent killing.38  Rather, manslaughter is defined as a
reckless killing.39  Therefore, the intent requirement excludes those individuals
who commit manslaughter.40
Furthermore, some states have taken steps to ensure that slayer statutes
prevent a killer from benefiting from his own wrongdoing in cases of both
intentional and unintentional felonious killings (including manslaughter kill-
ings).41  For example, Alaska has completely removed the word “intentionally”
from its slayer statute to ensure the statute covers unintentional homicides,
including manslaughter.42  In addition, Alaska has created a manifest injustice
exception for unintentional homicides.43  An Alaskan court may apply the man-
ifest injustice exception “if the court makes special findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law” that applying the slayer statute to an unintentional felonious
killing would be unjust.44  The Alaska Supreme Court, in In re Estate of Rich-
ard Blodgett,45 analyzed whether the manifest injustice exception applied to a
31 Blackwell, supra note 12, at 169.
32 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 (2003).
The Nevada slayer statute is not based on the Uniform Probate Code and consequently the
Restatement serves as mere guidance in interpreting the Nevada slayer statute. See id.
reporter’s note 1.
33 Id. cmt. f.





39 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(a) (2001).
40 In re Estate of Blodgett, 147 P.3d 702, 705 n.13 (Alaska 2006) (citations omitted).
41 See id. at 705 (removing the intent requirement from the definition of when an offender is
a slayer under the slayer statute); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 41B.250(3)(c) (2007) (adding
voluntary manslaughter to the definition of when an offender is a slayer under the slayer
statute); February 24, 1999 Minutes:  Hearing on Assem. B. 159 Before the Assem. Comm.
on Judiciary, 1999 Leg., 70th Sess. (Nev. 1999) [hereinafter February 24, 1999 Minutes].
42 In re Blodgett, 147 P.3d at 705.
43 Id. at 706.
44 Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.803(k) (2008)).
45 In re Blodgett, 147 P.3d 702.
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son who was convicted of negligent homicide for driving a dump truck while
his father was entangled in the truck and was ultimately dragged to his death.46
The Blodgett court held no manifest injustice resulted from applying the slayer
statute to the son because the son was capable of financially sustaining himself
without receiving the policy proceeds.47
Nevada is another example of a state that has taken steps to ensure that its
slayer statute covers both intentional and unintentional homicide.48  The origi-
nal Nevada slayer statute, codified at Nevada Revised Statutes section
688A.420, excluded manslaughter killings by prohibiting a person from collect-
ing the proceeds of a life insurance policy if he was convicted of the policy-
holder’s murder.49 Life Insurance Co. of North America v. Wollett50 represents
an example of the Nevada Supreme Court strictly construing the original
Nevada slayer statute and allowing a wife convicted of manslaughter to collect
life insurance policy proceeds.51  In Wollett, Elizabeth Wollett shot and killed
her husband and was subsequently charged with murder.52  Pursuant to a plea
bargain agreement, the court reduced Mrs. Wollett’s conviction to involuntary
manslaughter.53  The Nevada Supreme Court allowed Mrs. Wollett to receive
her husband’s life insurance policy proceeds because it held that the Nevada
slayer statute clearly and unambiguously prohibited only those convicted of
murder from profiting from their own wrongs.54  Therefore, Mrs. Wollett was
allowed to collect the policy proceeds as a result of her manslaughter
conviction.55
In 1999, the Nevada Legislature amended its slayer statute to prevent per-
sons convicted of manslaughter from collecting insurance proceeds.56  Legisla-
tive history reveals the Nevada Legislature looked to its fellow Ninth Circuit
states, California, Idaho, and Oregon, for guidance when it contemplated
whether to amend the Nevada slayer statute.57  California, Idaho, and Oregon
all prohibit a beneficiary convicted of murder or voluntary manslaughter to
collect policy proceeds.58  After deliberation, the Nevada Legislature amended
its slayer statute to define a felonious and intentional killing as a killing that
constitutes murder of the first or second degree or voluntary manslaughter.59
Therefore, under the current Nevada slayer statute, Mrs. Wollett would not
have been allowed to benefit from killing her husband, despite her manslaugh-
ter conviction.60
46 Id. at 703 n.2.
47 Id. at 704.
48 February 24, 1999 Minutes, supra note 41.
49 Id.
50 LIFE INS. CO. OF N. AM. V. WOLLETT, 766 P.2d 893 (Nev. 1988).
51 See id. at 894-95.
52 Id. at 894.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 895.
55 Id.
56 February 24, 1999 Minutes, supra note 41.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.; see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 41B.250(3)(c) (2007).
60 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41B.250(3)(c) (2007).
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B. The Nevada Slayer Statute
The current Nevada slayer statute is codified in a series of statutes incor-
porating the ancient maxim that a slayer may not benefit from his wrongdo-
ing.61  Under the current Nevada Revised Statutes section 41B.200(1), “a killer
cannot profit or benefit from his wrong.”62  A “killer” is a person who is
deemed to be a culpable actor in a “felonious” and “intentional killing,” and
convicted in a criminal proceeding of murder of either the first or second
degree or voluntary manslaughter.63  A person may also be a “killer” if he or
she is found, by a preponderance of evidence in a civil proceeding, to be “a
culpable actor in the felonious and intentional killing of the decedent.”64
Furthermore, the Nevada slayer statute provides protection for insurance
companies that pay life insurance policy proceeds to slayers without actual
knowledge that the beneficiary is the slayer.65  Pursuant to Nevada Revised
Statutes section 41B.400:
Except as otherwise provided by specific statute, if a payor or other third person,
in good faith, pays or transfers any property, interest or benefit to a beneficiary in
accordance with the provisions of a governing instrument, the payor or other third
person is not liable to another person who alleges that the payment or transfer to the
beneficiary violated the provisions of this chapter unless, before the payment or
transfer, the payor or other third person had actual knowledge that the beneficiary
was prohibited from acquiring or receiving the property, interest or benefit pursuant
to the provisions of this chapter.66
However, nowhere in the Nevada slayer statute did the legislature define
“actual knowledge.”  An insurance company is thus faced with the “to pay or
not to pay” dilemma when it is questionable whether the insurance company
actually knows that the beneficiary is the slayer of the insured.
C. Other States’ Slayer Statutes in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
States in both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have similar slayer statutes to
the Nevada statute, with the exception of one major difference–they expressly
define when a court may hold an insurance company liable for disbursing the
policy proceeds to a beneficiary.67  In every Ninth and Tenth Circuit state
(except Nevada), the statutes expressly provide that a court may hold an insur-
ance company liable if it distributes the proceeds to a beneficiary after the
insurance company receives written notice of a claim adverse to the benefici-
61 See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41B.010-.420 (2007).
62 Id. § 41B.200(1).
63 Id. § 41B.250(1), (3)(c).
64 Id. § 41B.260(2).
65 Id. § 41B.400.
66 Id. (emphasis added).
67 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.803(g) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803(G) (2008);
CAL. PROB. CODE § 256 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-803(8) (2008); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 560:2-803(h)(1) (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-803(k) (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 58-714(a)(1) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-813(8)(a) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 41B.400 (2007); N.M. STAT. § 45-2-803(H) (2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 231 (2008);
OR. REV. STAT. § 112.535 (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-803(8)(a) (2008); WASH. REV.
CODE § 11.84.110 (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-14-101(c) (2008).
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ary.68  An insurance company receives written notice of an adverse claim when
a person mails to the insurance company a claim that the beneficiary is not
entitled to the proceeds.69  Oral notice is insufficient to hold the insurer
liable.70
The Arizona slayer statute exemplifies the “written notice” language that
the states within the Ninth and Tenth Circuits use to define when an insurance
company is liable for distributing the policy proceeds to a beneficiary.71  Pursu-
ant to Arizona Revised Statutes section 14-2803(G):
A payor or other third party is not liable for having made a payment or trans-
ferred an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a gov-
erning instrument affected by an intentional and felonious killing or for having taken
any other action in good faith reliance on the validity of the governing instrument on
request and satisfactory proof of the decedent’s death and before the payor or other
third party received written notice of a claimed forfeiture or revocation under this
section. Any payor or other third party is liable for a payment made or any other
action taken after the payor or other third party received written notice of a claimed
forfeiture or revocation under this section.72
The case Alfa Life Insurance Corp. v. Culverhouse73 provides an excellent
example of courts strictly construing the express written notice requirement.74
In Alfa, an unknown killer murdered the insured, a father of two sons, Jason
Hunter and Robert Culverhouse.75  Jason Hunter was the named beneficiary on
his father’s life insurance policy.76  Mr. Hunter’s brother, Robert Culverhouse,
believed that Mr. Hunter murdered their father.77  Mr. Culverhouse called the
insurance company and orally notified it of his claim to the policy proceeds
because he believed Mr. Hunter was a prime suspect of the insured’s murder.78
One month after Mr. Culverhouse’s phone call, the insurance company paid
Mr. Hunter the full amount due under his father’s insurance policy.79  Four
68 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.803(g) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803(G) (2008);
CAL. PROB. CODE § 256 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-803(8) (2008); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 560:2-803(h)(1) (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-803(k) (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 58-714(a)(1) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-813(8)(a) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 41B.400 (2007); N.M. STAT. § 45-2-803(H) (2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 231 (2008);
OR. REV. STAT. § 112.535 (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-803(8)(a) (2008); WASH. REV.
CODE § 11.84.110 (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-14-101(c) (2008).
69 Alfa Life Ins. Corp. v. Culverhouse, 729 So. 2d 325, 328-29 (Ala. 1999).
70 Id.
71 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803(G) (2008).
72 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803(G) (2008) (emphasis added); see also CAL. PROB.
CODE § 256 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-803(8) (2008); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 560:2-803(h)(1) (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-803(k) (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-
714(a)(1) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-813(8)(a) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41B.400
(2007); N.M. STAT. § 45-2-803(H) (2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 231 (2008); OR. REV.
STAT. § 112.535 (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-803(8)(a) (2008); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 11.84.110 (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-14-101(c) (2008).
73 Alfa Life Ins. Corp., 729 So. 2d 325.
74 See generally id.
75 Id. at 325.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 326.
78 Id.
79 Id.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-2\NVJ208.txt unknown Seq: 9 21-MAY-09 10:28
Winter 2009] TO PAY OR NOT TO PAY 483
years after the insurance company paid the policy proceeds, Mr. Hunter admit-
ted to having killed his father.80  Mr. Culverhouse subsequently filed a lawsuit
against the insurance company, alleging the insurance company should have
paid the policy proceeds to him instead of his brother, the killer.81  The Alfa
court held the insurance company did not have actual notice of Mr.
Culverhouse’s adverse claim because Mr. Culverhouse did not send written
notice of his claim to the insurance company’s home office or principal
address, as required by the Alaska slayer statute.82  The court concluded Mr.
Culverhouse’s oral notice to the insurance company of his adverse claim was
insufficient to provide the insurance company with actual notice.83
The ensuing section analyzes the insurance companies’ “to pay or not to
pay” dilemma, the possible definitions of “actual knowledge,” and proposes
defining “actual knowledge” as “written notice” so as to clarify when an insur-
ance company is liable for paying policy proceeds to a beneficiary in Nevada.
III. DILEMMA SOLVED:  ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE AS WRITTEN NOTICE
A. The Insurance Companies’ “to Pay or Not to Pay” Dilemma
Insurance companies have a duty to pay insurance policy proceeds to the
correct recipient in a “timely and reasonable manner.”84  An insurance com-
pany’s obligation to pay is owed to the primary and contingent beneficiaries of
an insurance policy.85  In general, if an insurer pays the proceeds to the proper
recipient in good faith, then the payment discharges the insurer from liability
on the policy.86  By contrast, when a beneficiary of an insurance policy is
convicted of a felonious and intentional killing of an insured, the beneficiary is
a slayer for purposes of a slayer statute and the insurance company’s duty is
clear:  it cannot pay out the policy proceeds to the beneficiary.87
An insurance company may find itself in the “to pay or not to pay”
dilemma, however, when a beneficiary is a suspect or accused of an insured’s
death, but not convicted of a felonious and intentional killing in a criminal
proceeding, or found to be the slayer in a civil proceeding.88  If the insurance
company pays the beneficiary, it faces possible litigation from the decedent’s
family or estate.89  If the insurance company refuses to pay the beneficiary, it
faces potential litigation from the beneficiary for breach of contract or bad
faith.90  The “to pay or not to pay” dilemma occurs in Nevada because it is
80 Id.
81 Id. at 325.
82 Id. at 328-29.
83 Id.
84 Schuman, supra note 3, at 219.
85 Id.
86 Alfa Life Ins. Corp., 729 So. 2d at 327.
87 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 cmt. d.
(2003).  The Nevada slayer statute is not based on the Uniform Probate Code and conse-
quently the Restatement serves as mere guidance in interpreting the Nevada slayer statute.
See id. reporter’s note 1.
88 See Schuman, supra note 3, at 198–99.
89 See id. at 198.
90 See id.
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unclear when an insurance company would have “actual knowledge” that a
beneficiary is the killer of an insured.91
B. What is “Actual Knowledge?”
Although the Nevada Legislature did not define “actual knowledge” in the
slayer statute, it defined “knowingly” in Title 15 for crimes and punishments.92
Pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes section 193.017, which is codified in Title
15, “‘knowingly’ imports a knowledge that the facts exist which constitute the
act or omission of a crime, and does not require knowledge of its unlawfulness.
Knowledge of any particular fact may be inferred from the knowledge of such
other facts as should put an ordinarily prudent person upon inquiry.”93  How-
ever, it is unclear whether this definition would be applicable to the Nevada
slayer statute.  In fact, as Brad Wilkinson, a member of the Committee Coun-
sel, Legal Division of the Legislative Counsel Bureau for the State of Nevada,
noted during the March 5, 1999 Senate Committee hearing regarding the
Nevada slayer statute, “actual knowledge” in the Nevada slayer statute could be
defined as either:  (1) direct knowledge; or (2) reason to know or constructive
notice.94
The difference in the two definitions likely would affect an insurance
company’s willingness to pay out the policy proceeds to a beneficiary.  Mr.
Wilkinson’s first definition of “actual knowledge,” direct knowledge, creates a
higher burden than constructive notice to prove an insurance company actually
knew a beneficiary was the killer of an insured.  Such a high standard would
more readily allow an insurance company to pay the policy proceeds to a
named beneficiary because absent a criminal conviction, civil suit, or written
notice of adverse claims, it is less likely an insurance company will have direct
knowledge a beneficiary is the killer of an insured.  By contrast, Mr. Wilkin-
son’s second definition of “actual knowledge,” reason to know or constructive
notice, is a much lower burden of proof.  The lower standard would hinder an
insurance company’s willingness to pay policy proceeds to a beneficiary
because it would increase its potential liability by making it easier to prove the
insurer had “actual knowledge” that a beneficiary is the killer of an insured.
The more appropriate definition of “actual knowledge” in the Nevada
slayer statute is direct knowledge.  The legislative history underlying the
Nevada slayer statute, and the commonly accepted definition of “actual knowl-
edge” in other states within the Ninth and Tenth Circuits support interpreting
“actual knowledge” to mean exactly what it implies:  that an insurance com-
pany must have direct knowledge that a beneficiary is in fact the killer of an
insured.
91 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41B.400 (2007).
92 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.017 (2007).
93 Id.
94 See March 5, 1999 Minutes:  Hearing on Assem. B. 159 Before the S. Comm. on Judici-
ary, 1999 Leg., 70th Sess. (Nev. 1999) [hereinafter March 5, 1999 Minutes].
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1. Nevada Legislators Have Interpreted “Actual Knowledge” in the
Slayer Statute
Courts consider the legislature’s intent when interpreting an ambiguous
statute.95  Furthermore, when a statute is prone to multiple interpretations,
courts consider reason and public policy to decipher the legislature’s intent in
order to apply the law in accord with that foreseen by the adopting legisla-
ture.96  The legislative history underlying the Nevada slayer statute demon-
strates the legislature’s intent that the standard for “actual knowledge” should
be interpreted as meaning “direct knowledge,” rather than “reason to know” or
“constructive notice.”97  The following is a brief recitation of the legislative
history behind Nevada’s current slayer statute, as amended.
On February 24, 1999, Assemblywoman Dawn Gibbons of District
Twenty-Five presented Assembly Bill 159 at the Assembly Committee on Judi-
ciary hearing.98  Assembly Bill 159 proposed an amendment to the Nevada
slayer statute to further prevent collection of life insurance proceeds “if the
beneficiary committed voluntary manslaughter or conspired to commit the mur-
der of the policyholder.”99  Additionally, Assembly Bill 159 proposed to hold
an insurance company liable for paying proceeds when it had “actual knowl-
edge” that a beneficiary is the killer of an insured.100  The Assembly Commit-
tee on Judiciary passed the bill unanimously on February 26, 1999 and referred
the bill to the Senate Committee on Judiciary.101
On March 5, 1999, the Senate Committee on Judiciary heard the measure
proposed by Ms. Gibbons.102  Fred Hillerby, a lobbyist for the American Coun-
cil of Life Insurance, and Senator Valerie Wiener, discussed what constituted
“actual knowledge” to hold an insurance company liable for paying policy pro-
ceeds to a beneficiary.103  Understandably, several insurance company lobby-
ists were present at the Senate Committee on Judiciary’s hearing.104
Mr. Hillerby expressed concern with holding an insurance company liable
when it is under an obligation to pay the policy proceeds within a certain period
of time.105  Mr. Hillerby noted that the original Nevada slayer statute, prior to
its amendment, required the insurer to pay the proceeds within thirty days of
the death of the insured.106  Therefore, Mr. Hillerby argued that an insurance
company likely would have paid the proceeds prior to a determination of
whether a beneficiary was the killer of the insured.107
In response to Mr. Hillerby’s concerns, Senator Wiener asked Mr. Hil-
lerby whether there was a distinction between “actual knowledge” and “knowl-
95 County of Clark ex. rel. Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Upchurch, 961 P.2d 754, 757 (Nev. 1998).
96 Id.
97 See March 5, 1999 Minutes, supra note 94.
98 February 24, 1999 Minutes, supra note 41.
99 Id.
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edge.”108  Brad Wilkinson, a member of the Committee Counsel, Legal
Division of the Legislative Counsel Bureau, added to Senator Weiner’s inquiry
by distinguishing between “actual” and “constructive” knowledge.109  Mr. Wil-
kinson stated that “constructive knowledge” means “a person has reason to
know something, but does not actually know it,” whereas “actual knowledge”
means a person actually knows something.110  Following the same discussion,
Chairman Mark James suggested, “the language should probably be ‘knowl-
edge’ or ‘reason to know.’”111
The Nevada Legislature consciously rejected Chairman James’ suggestion
and instead, intentionally used the term “actual knowledge.”112  If the legisla-
ture intended to place the lesser standard of constructive notice on the payor of
a life insurance policy, the language of the current Nevada slayer statute would
have simply included the term “knowledge” or “reason to know,” rather than
the term “actual knowledge.”113  Furthermore, as numerous insurance company
lobbyists were present at the Senate Committee on Judiciary hearing,114 the
insurance industry likely would not have supported the amendment if it
believed the legislature intended “actual knowledge” to mean the lesser stan-
dard of “reason to know” or “constructive notice.”  Thus, the Nevada Legisla-
ture intended to hold an insurance company liable if it pays the proceeds to a
beneficiary when it actually knows the beneficiary was the killer of the insured.
2. Interpretation of “Actual Knowledge” in Nevada Should Be
Consistent with the Commonly Accepted Definition of “Actual
Knowledge”
“Actual knowledge” means exactly what it imports:  “‘knowing’ rather
than ‘reason for knowing.’”115  In fact, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “actual
knowledge” as “[d]irect and clear knowledge, as distinguished from construc-
tive knowledge.”116 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “constructive knowledge”
as “[k]nowledge that one using reasonable care or diligence should have, and
therefore that is attributed by law to a given person.”117  Therefore, “actual
knowledge,” by its clear and common meaning, requires actual notice of an
actual event.118  It cannot be a mere suspicion of a possible event because that
goes beyond the use of reasonable care required for constructive knowledge.119
Consequently, the actual knowledge requirement in the Nevada slayer statute
should comply with the commonly accepted meaning of “actual knowledge”





112 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41B.400 (2007).
113 See id.
114 See March 5, 1999 Minutes, supra note 94.
115 Tipton v. Town of Tabor, 567 N.W.2d 351, 359 (S.D. 1997); Walther v. KPKA Meado-
wlands Ltd. P’ship, 581 N.W.2d 527, 532 (S.D. 1998).
116 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 888 (8th ed. 2004).
117 Id.
118 Tipton, 567 N.W.2d at 359; Walther, 581 N.W.2d at 532.
119 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 888 (8th ed. 2004).
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the insured; and (2) the insurance company actually knows that a beneficiary
was the killer prior to the time it paid out the policy proceeds to the beneficiary.
3. A Lesser Standard Than “Actual Knowledge” Requires an
Insurance Company To Act as the Jury to Determine Whether a
Beneficiary is a Killer
In circumstances where there is no criminal conviction or civil claim
against a beneficiary, interpreting “actual knowledge” as meaning “constructive
notice” would force an insurance company to act as the jury by judging
whether a beneficiary is in fact the killer of an insured.  Lucille Lusk, a lobbyist
for Nevada Concerned Citizens, remarked during the 1999 Senate on Judiciary
Committee hearing, that “ultimately[,] the insurance company can decide if
somebody is guilty of murder.”120  Chairman James countered that juries
decide cases, not insurance companies.121  However, Ms. Lusk advocated
allowing a criminal court to determine if someone is guilty of murder rather
than “have a civil situation where the insurance company is making decisions
that it will not pay even though the criminal courts are not convicting.”122  Ms.
Lusk concluded, “if the criminal court cannot prove murder under the proper
standard for murder, there ought to be no penalties as if a murder were
committed.”123
Ms. Lusk’s opinion that an insurance company should not determine
whether a beneficiary is guilty of murder is both logical and reasonable.  Insur-
ance companies lack the knowledge and resources to judge whether a benefici-
ary is a slayer under the slayer statute.  Although Chairman James noted that
juries decide murder cases, in the absence of a criminal conviction or civil
judgment, an insurance company must play the role of the jury and decide who
should receive the policy proceeds.  Placing this burden on insurance compa-
nies, which are ill equipped to determine whether a beneficiary is the killer of
an insured, is unacceptable.
C. Nevada’s Sister States in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits Expressly
Provide When an Insurance Company May Be Liable
The Nevada Legislature likely did not define “actual knowledge” in its
slayer statute because it did not anticipate statutory constructions other than
direct knowledge.  In contrast to Nevada, all of the other states within the Ninth
and Tenth Circuits expressly provide that an insurance company is not liable if
it pays the policy proceeds to a beneficiary before receiving written notice of a
claimed lack of entitlement, forfeiture or revocation.124  Further, it is reasona-
ble to look to Nevada’s sister states for guidance because the Nevada Legisla-




124 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.803(g) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803(G) (2008);
CAL. PROB. CODE § 256 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-803(8) (2008); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 560:2-803(h)(1) (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-803(k) (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 58-714(a)(1) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-813(8)(a) (2007); N.M. STAT. § 45-2-
803(H) (2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 231 (2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.535 (2008); UTAH
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ture previously looked to California, Idaho, and Oregon when it amended its
definition of a killer in its slayer statute to include a person convicted of volun-
tary manslaughter.125
Although all of the Ninth and Tenth Circuit states, except Nevada, require
written notice, the complexity of the definition of written notice varies among
the states.  For example, Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, and Montana from the Ninth
Circuit, and Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, and Utah from the Tenth Circuit,
all define written notice in explicit detail.126  Under these states’ statutes, a
claimant must mail written notice of his or her adverse claim to the insurance
company’s main office or home address by certified mail, return receipt
requested, or serve the insurance company in the same manner as a summons in
a civil action.127  Once an insurance company receives written notice of an
adverse claim, it may pay any amount owed under the insurance policy to a
court having jurisdiction over the probate proceedings relating to the decedent’s
estate.128  If no probate proceedings relating to the decedent’s estate have com-
menced, an insurance company may then pay the amount owed under the insur-
ance policy to a court having jurisdiction of probate proceedings relating to the
decedent’s estate located in the county of the decedent’s former residence.129
After an insurance company pays the money to the court, the court relieves the
insurance company from any and all claims for the policy proceeds.130  The
court then holds the monies until it determines who is rightfully and lawfully
entitled to the proceeds.131
With the exception of Nevada, the remaining states within the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits (California, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington from the Ninth Cir-
CODE ANN. § 75-2-803(8)(a) (2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.84.110 (2008); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 2-14-101(c) (2008).
125 See February 24, 1999 Minutes, supra note 41; see also discussion supra Part II.A. See
generally NEV. REV. STAT. § 41B.250(3)(c) (2007).
126 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.803(h) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803(H) (2008);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-803(8)(b) (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-803(h)(2) (2008);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-714(a)(2) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-813(8)(b) (2007); N.M.
STAT. § 45-2-803(H) (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-803(8)(b) (2008).
127 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.803(h) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803(H) (2008);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-803(8)(b) (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-803(h)(2) (2008);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-714(a)(2) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-813(8)(b) (2007); N.M.
STAT. § 45-2-803(H) (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-803(8)(b) (2008).
128 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.803(h) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803(H) (2008);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-803(8)(c) (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-803(h)(2) (2008);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-714(a)(2) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-813(8)(b) (2007); N.M.
STAT. § 45-2-803(H) (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-803(8)(b) (2008).
129 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.803(h) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803(H) (2008);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-803(8)(c) (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-803(h)(2) (2008);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-714(a)(2) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-813(8)(b) (2007); N.M.
STAT. § 45-2-803(H) (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-803(8)(b) (2008).
130 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.803(h) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803(H) (2008);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-803(8)(c) (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-803(h)(2) (2008);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-714(a)(2) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-813(8)(b) (2007); N.M.
STAT. § 45-2-803(H) (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-803(8)(b) (2008).
131 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.803(h) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803(H) (2008);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-803(8)(c) (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-803(h)(2) (2008);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-714(a)(2) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-813(8)(b) (2007); N.M.
STAT. § 45-2-803(H) (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-803(8)(b) (2008).
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cuit, and Oklahoma and Wyoming from the Tenth Circuit) also establish that an
insurance company making a payment according to the terms of its policy is
not liable unless it has received written notice of an adverse claim.132  How-
ever, these states do not define the circumstances surrounding written notice as
explicitly as the Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Montana, Colorado, Kansas, New
Mexico, and Utah statutes.133  For example, these remaining states do not
explain the steps an insurance company should take once it receives written
notice (e.g., paying the proceeds to the court).134  Furthermore, the California,
Idaho, and Washington statutes are more explicit than the Oklahoma, Oregon,
and Wyoming statutes because they expressly provide that an insurance com-
pany may not be liable for paying policy proceeds to the beneficiary unless it
has received written notice by a claimant “at its home office or principal
address.”135  By contrast, the Oklahoma, Oregon, and Wyoming statutes do not
specify where the claimant must send the written notice.136
Nevada should follow its sister states and interpret the “actual knowledge”
requirement in the Nevada slayer statute as written notice.  The definition of
“actual knowledge” as written notice would eliminate the subjective inconsis-
tencies of a constructive notice standard and would require documented proof
that the payor of a policy has actual notice of probative and provable facts that
justify withholding payment on a policy.
D. Solutions
1. The Insurance Companies Should Lobby the Nevada Legislature to
Amend the Statute to Define “Actual Knowledge” as Written
Notice
The Nevada Legislature should amend the current Nevada slayer statute to
define “actual knowledge” as written notice of an adverse claim.137  For exam-
ple, the legislature could amend the Nevada slayer statute to provide the
following:
Except as otherwise provided by specific statute, if a payor or other third person,
in good faith, pays or transfers any property, interest or benefit to a beneficiary in
132 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 256 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-803(k) (2008);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 231 (2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.535 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 11.84.110 (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-14-101(c) (2008).
133 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.803(h) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803(H) (2008);
CAL. PROB. CODE § 256 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-803(8)(b)–(c) (2008);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-803(h)(2) (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-803(k) (2008); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 58-714(a)(2) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-813(8)(b) (2007); N.M. STAT.
§ 45-2-803(H) (2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 231 (2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.535 (2008);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-803(8)(b) (2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.84.110 (2008); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 2-14-101(c) (2008).
134 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 256 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-803(k) (2008);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 231 (2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.535 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 11.84.110 (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-14-101(c) (2008).
135 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 256 (West 2008) (emphasis added); see also IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 15-2-803(k) (2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.84.110 (2008).
136 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 231 (2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.535 (2008); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 2-14-101(c) (2008).
137 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41B.400 (2007).
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accordance with the provisions of a governing instrument, the payor or other third
person is not liable to another person who alleges that the payment or transfer to the
beneficiary violated the provisions of this chapter unless, before the payment or
transfer, the payor or other third person had actual knowledge that the beneficiary
was prohibited from acquiring or receiving the property, interest or benefit pursuant
to the provisions of this chapter.138
The payor or other third person has actual knowledge that the beneficiary was
prohibited from acquiring or receiving the property, interest or benefit pursuant to the
provisions of this chapter if the payor or other third person has received written
notice of a claimed forfeiture or revocation or lack of entitlement.  The written notice
shall indicate the name of the decedent, the name of the person asserting an interest,
the nature of the payment or item of property or other benefit, and a statement that a
claim of forfeiture or revocation or lack of entitlement is being made under this
section.  The written notice shall be mailed to the payor’s or other third party’s main
office or home by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or served
upon the payor or other third party in the same manner as a summons in a civil
action.139
If the Nevada Legislature fails to amend the slayer statute to define “actual
knowledge” as written notice of an adverse claim, insurance companies will
continue to face the “to pay or not to pay” dilemma.  Consider the following
hypothetical.  The law enforcement, while investigating a homicide, informs an
insurance company that a beneficiary is a person not to be permanently
excluded as a suspect.  However, the beneficiary is never actually charged or
convicted of killing the insured.  Neither the police, the district attorney’s
office, nor an investigative grand jury with the ability to subpoena witnesses
and compel testimony under oath, are able to assemble sufficient evidence to
bring a criminal case against anyone, whether the beneficiary or otherwise, for
any crime involving the death of the insured.
Under the facts of this hypothetical and the current Nevada slayer statute,
whether the insurance company has “actual knowledge” that the beneficiary is
the killer of the insured would remain unknown.  Surely, it is absurd to expect
the insurance company to conclude, without a court’s assistance, that the bene-
ficiary is the killer of the insured and to consequently withhold the policy
proceeds.
Of course, the insurance company would have the option to file an inter-
pleader action.  However, amending the slayer statute for clarity is more cost
effective and resource efficient than requiring insurance companies to instigate
litigation (the interpleader action) every time they are faced with the “to pay or
not to pay” dilemma or to defend themselves in litigation filed by either the
decedent’s family or the beneficiary.140  If the legislature amended the Nevada
slayer statute to provide that an insurance company is not liable unless it has
received written notice of an adverse claim prior to paying the proceeds to the
beneficiary, the “actual knowledge” ambiguity would be resolved, and an insur-
138 The foregoing language is the text of the current Nevada slayer statute. See id. (empha-
sis added).
139 The foregoing language is not currently in the Nevada slayer statute and is suggested in
accordance with the slayer statutes in the Ninth and Tenth Circuit states.
140 See the discussion of an insurance company’s option to file an interpleader action infra
Part III.D.3.
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ance company would know exactly when to pay and when not to pay the policy
proceeds under the above hypothetical.
2. An Insurance Company May Attempt to Avoid Liability by
Providing a Slayer Clause in its Insurance Policy Contracts
An insurance company facing litigation may attempt to rely on its policy
contract with the insured to avoid any potential liability.141  An insurance com-
pany could incorporate in its contract a clause relieving the insurance company
from liability for refusing to issue the policy proceeds to the beneficiary if the
beneficiary killed the insured.142  Following the language of the Nevada slayer
statute, the contract clause could also state, “the insurance company is not lia-
ble for paying the policy proceeds to the beneficiary unless it has actual knowl-
edge that the beneficiary is the slayer of the insured.”  In fact, an insurance
company may exceed the language of the current Nevada slayer statute by
adding to the contract clause that it is relieved of liability unless it has received
written notice of an adverse claim.
The case Polish National Alliance of United States of North America v.
Crowley143 is an example of an insurance company successfully relying on its
contract to avoid liability in this context.144  In Polish, the court held the bene-
ficiary who murdered the insured was precluded from recovering the insurance
policy proceeds pursuant to a clause in the insurance policy that stated, “[n]o
mortuary benefit shall be paid to the beneficiaries of a member after his death,
if the member lost his life by reason of any act or acts designed on the part of
the beneficiary or beneficiaries for the purpose of securing the mortuary bene-
fit.”145  Therefore, as exemplified in Polish, an insurance company may be able
to defeat an adverse claim to the policy proceeds by relying on a specific provi-
sion in the insurance policy contract.146
3. An Insurance Company May Also Attempt to Avoid Liability by
Filing an Interpleader Action
An insurance company’s safest alternative may be to instigate an inter-
pleader action.147  Under the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 67(a),
“[i]n an action in which any part of the relief sought is a . . . disposition of a
sum of money . . . a party . . . may deposit with the court all or any part of such
sum or thing to be held by the clerk of the court . . . subject to withdrawal . . . at
any time thereafter upon order of the court.”148
141 See F. S. Tinio, Annotation, KiLLING OF INSURED BY BENEFICIARY AS AFFECTING LIFE
INSURANCE OR ITS PROCEEDS, 27 A.L.R.3D 794, 819 (1969).
142 See id.
143 Polish Nat’l Alliance of U.S. of N. Am. v. Crowley, 176 N.E. 492 (Ohio Ct. App. 1930).
144 Id. at 492.
145 Id.
146 See Tinio, supra note 141, at 819; see also Polish Nat’l Alliance, 176 N.E. at 492.
147 See generally David B. Levendusky, Annotation, AVAILABILITY OF INTERPLEADER TO
INSURANCE COMPANY FOR RESOLVING DISPUTE AS TO INSURANCE POLICY UNDER FEDERAL
INTERPLEADER ACTS (PRESENTLY 28 USCS §§ 1335, 1397, 2361) AND RULE 22 OF FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 19 A.L.R. FED. 166 (1974); see also Schuman, supra note 3, at
221.
148 NEV. R. CIV. P. 67(a).
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An interpleader action’s primary purpose is to protect the stakeholder,
such as an insurance company, from multiple liability and the expense of multi-
ple lawsuits.149  An interpleader action is not denied even if “the possibility of
multiple liability or multiple litigation is remote or rests on tenuous
grounds.”150  Therefore, a stakeholder can instigate an interpleader action to
avoid the expense of defending multiple claims in court.151  An insurance com-
pany may file an interpleader action even if it maintains that only one of the
adverse claims has merit.152  Although an insurance company is likely to resist
instigating a legal action, interpleader is an attractive and cost-effective alterna-
tive to defending against multiple lawsuits from multiple parties.
An interpleader action will also ensure insurance policy proceeds are
justly paid.  During the debates surrounding the amendment of the Nevada
slayer statute in 1999, Chairman James argued that the objective of adding the
“actual knowledge” language to the slayer statute was to reach a just result, not
necessarily to minimize litigation.153  Allowing the courts, rather than an insur-
ance company, to determine who should receive the policy proceeds better
serves justice, because the courts are better equipped to make such a
determination.
State Farm Life Insurance Co. v. Pearce154 illustrates an example of an
insurance company filing an interpleader action when it was not clear who was
lawfully entitled to the policy proceeds, given the circumstances surrounding
the insured’s death.155  IN State Farm, Wayne Pearce owned three State Farm
insurance policies, totaling $200,000.156  The insurance policies named Roberta
Pearce, Wayne Pearce’s wife, as the primary beneficiary and her sister, Char-
lotte Miles, as the contingent beneficiary.157  On January 31, 1989, Mrs. Pearce
stabbed her husband to death.158  Mrs. Pearce was charged and convicted of
first-degree murder and shortly thereafter, she assigned her rights under the
insurance policies to Ms. Miles.159
Both Wayne Pearce’s estate and Ms. Miles demanded from State Farm the
insurance policy proceeds.160  Consequently, State Farm filed an interpleader
action and deposited the proceeds with the clerk of the court.161  State Farm
obtained a dismissal from the action, thereby relinquishing any exposure to
liability for payment of the proceeds.162  Therefore, as exemplified in State
Farm, an insurance company may wash its hands of the “to pay or not to pay”
149 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bayona, 223 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
150 Noey v. Bledsoe, 978 P.2d 1264, 1272 (Alaska 1999) (citations omitted).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 See March 5, 1999 Minutes, supra note 94.
154 STATE FARM LIFE INS. CO. V. PEARCE, 286 Cal. Rptr. 267 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
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dilemma by filing an interpleader action and allowing the court to determine
who should receive the proceeds.
IV. CONCLUSION
In 1999, the Nevada Legislature amended the Nevada slayer statute and
provided that an insurance company is not liable for paying policy proceeds to
a beneficiary, unless it has “actual knowledge” that the beneficiary is the killer
of the insured.163  Unfortunately, the Nevada slayer statute, as amended, does
not define “actual knowledge.”164  As a result, insurance companies in Nevada
find themselves in the “to pay or not to pay” dilemma under circumstances
where it is unclear whether the beneficiary is the killer because there is no
criminal charge, no criminal conviction,165 and no civil judgment against the
beneficiary.166  Consequently, if an insurance company pays the policy pro-
ceeds to the beneficiary, it may face a bad faith claim from the estate or the
contingent beneficiary.167  By contrast, if an insurance company pays the pol-
icy proceeds to the estate or the contingent beneficiary, it may face a breach of
contract or bad faith claim from the primary beneficiary.168
To resolve the “to pay or not to pay” dilemma in Nevada, the Nevada
Legislature should amend its slayer statute to define “actual knowledge” as
written notice.  Under such a definition, an insurance company would not be
liable unless it paid the policy proceeds to a beneficiary after receiving written
notice of a claim adverse to the beneficiary.  Even if the Nevada Legislature
does not amend its slayer statute, an insurance company should incorporate a
slayer clause in its insurance policy contracts, which would provide that the
insurance company is not liable for refusing to pay a beneficiary who is the
slayer of the insured.169  Any such clause should also include language stating,
“in the event that the insurance company pays the beneficiary, the insurance
company is not liable unless it had actual knowledge, meaning written notice of
an adverse claim, that the beneficiary was the slayer of the insured, at the time
of payment.”  This explicit contract provision would alleviate the Nevada Leg-
islature’s failure to define “actual knowledge” in the current Nevada slayer stat-
ute.  Furthermore, an insurance company’s most viable alternative when facing
the “to pay or not to pay” dilemma is to file an interpleader action and pay the
policy proceeds to a court.170  By doing so, an insurance company will wash its
hands of multiple liability and the court, rather than the insurance company,
will determine which party should receive the proceeds.171  The interpleader
action will consequently save an insurance company the expense of defending
multiple adverse claims from multiple parties.
163 See March 5, 1999 Minutes, supra note 94; see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 41B.400 (2007).
164 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41B.400 (2007).
165 See id. § 41B.250(3)(c).
166 See id. § 41B.260(2).
167 Schuman, supra note 3, at 221.
168 Id. at 222.
169 See Tinio, supra note 141, at 819.
170 See Schuman, supra note 3, at 221.
171 See STATE FARM LIFE INS. CO. V. PEARCE, 286 Cal. Rptr. 267, 268 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
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In sum, the best solution is for the Nevada Legislature to amend the slayer
statute to define “actual knowledge” as written notice.  Such an amendment
would, once and for all, resolve the insurance companies’ “to pay or not to pay”
dilemma in Nevada.
